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Introduction 
In this lawsuit, Weststar alleges trespass and unjust enrichment based upon 
Appellees' (collectively "Newfield") unauthorized use of a 4-mile natural gas 
pipeline between 1999 and 2005. (R. 369-71.) Newfield does not deny it used the 
pipeline. Newfield did not seek or receive authorization to use the pipeline. And 
Newfield does not claim that it paid anyone for its use of the pipeline. Instead, 
Newfield argues that it should escape all liability or summary judgment because 
Weststar did not provide evidence sufficient to create a factual dispute concerning 
whether Weststar has an ownership interest in the pipeline. 
In fact, in opposition to the motion for summary judgment Weststar provided 
an abundance of evidence of its ownership interest in the pipeline, all of which was 
undisputed. In 1991, the BLM granted Bonanza Gas Company, Inc. "a right to 
construct, operate, [and] maintain" the natural gas pipeline, which Bonanza did. (R. 
589.) William Gilmore testified that Bonanza then assigned title to the pipeline to 
him. (R. 371.) Mr. Gilmore then assigned title to the pipeline to Weststar in 2000. 
(R. 362-65.) In 2004, Weststar assigned a 50% interest in the pipeline to Houston 
Exploration. (R. 822.) 
In Newfield's response brief, it does not argue that it provided any evidence 
to dispute these facts in the district court.1 Instead, Newfield argues that Weststar 
1
 Weststar is appealing only the trial court's grant of summary judgment, not the 
denial of its motion to reconsider. While Weststar mentions in its opening brief the 
evidence presented with its motion to reconsider, Weststar's arguments do not rely 
upon this evidence. More important, the Court need not consider this evidence to 
has not provided enough evidence that Bonanza ever transferred title to Mr. 
Gilmore. Specifically, Newfield points out that Weststar failed to produce a copy of 
an "unrecorded assignment" of title from Bonanza to Mr. Gilmore. (Resp. Br. at 
17.) However, to be entitled to summary judgment Newfield must do more than call 
into question the credibility of Mr. Gilmore's affidavit testimony—that Bonanza 
transferred title to him—by pointing out that there is no longer a written copy of the 
assignment. This is especially the case here, where Mr. Gilmore's testimony is 
confirmed by numerous sources, most of which were part of the summary judgment 
record and one of which, admittedly, was submitted only as part of Weststar's 
subsequent motion to reconsider. 
First, in addition to Mr. Gilmore's affidavit, the 2000 assignment from Mr. 
Gilmore to Weststar is evidence that Mr. Gilmore had title to the pipeline in 2000, 
title he only could have obtained from Bonanza. Second, Newfield identified as an 
"undisputed fact" that in 2004 Houston Exploration obtained a 50% percent interest 
in the pipeline. This interest was obtained by assignment from Weststar and 
through the chain of title originating with the transfer from Bonanza to Mr. Gilmore. 
(R. 338.) Third, evidence presented with Weststar's motion to reconsider 
reverse. Thus, Newfield's arguments concerning an appeal from the denial of a 
motion to reconsider are inapposite and have no bearing on this appeal. 
Further, Newfield identifies that its main concern in the district court was 
Weststar's failure to abide by a scheduling order, a proper topic for a Rule 37, not a 
Rule 56, motion. The district court's order granting summary judgment concerns 
whether there is a disputed issue of material fact, not whether Weststar complied 
with a discovery order. 
2 
demonstrates that the BLM currently recognizes that Weststar owns the pipeline; 
again, something that could be true only if Bonanza transferred title to Mr. Gilmore. 
(R. 579, 628.) All of the circumstantial and direct evidence indicates that Bonanza 
transferred title of the pipeline to Mr. Gilmore. Newfield has presented no evidence 
to dispute this fact, let alone shown that this material fact has no support at all. The 
district court erred in granting Newfield's motion for summary judgment. 
The other argument Newfield advances, even if correct, does not provide an 
alternative ground to affirm the district court's order. Newfield argues that Weststar 
failed to join indispensable parties that have interests in the pipeline. This argument 
fails because (i) these entities are not necessary or indispensible, as defined in Rule 
19; and (ii) even if they were, only dismissal without prejudice would have been 
warranted. Therefore, regardless of whether Newfield's alternative argument is 
successful, Newfield is not entitled to dismissal on the merits and thereby a free 
pass for 6 years of unauthorized use of Weststar's pipeline. 
Argument 
In the opening brief, Weststar argued that the district court erred when it 
concluded that it is undisputed Weststar has no ownership interest in the pipeline. 
Weststar first argued that the district court erred by requiring Weststar to 
demonstrate an ownership, instead of a mere possessory, interest to maintain its 
trespass and unjust enrichment claims. Weststar then argued that William Gilmore's 
affidavit testimony outlining his personal knowledge of how title of the pipeline was 
3 
transferred from Bonanza to Mr. Gilmore to Weststar is, in fact, itself undisputed, 
and is at least sufficient to create a disputed issue of fact concerning whether 
Weststar owned the pipeline during Newfield's unauthorized use. 
In the response brief, Newfield argues that Weststar's argument that it was 
required to demonstrate only a possessory interest was not preserved because it was 
not presented to the district court before it entered summary judgment. (Resp. Br. at 
12-13.) Newfield then argues that Weststar failed to present sufficient evidence of 
its ownership of the pipeline because it failed to provide a copy of an unrecorded 
assignment of title to the pipeline from Bonanza to Mr. Gilmore. (Resp. Br. at 14-
15.) 
As demonstrated below, both arguments fail. The argument that Weststar 
need only establish a possessory interest in the pipeline was raised in conjunction 
with the motion for summary judgment, by both Weststar and Newfield. (R. 268; 
901:34-35.) Nonetheless, because it is undisputed on appeal that the issue of 
whether Weststar is the owner of the pipeline was preserved below, Weststar will 
address this argument first. 
L Weststar's Evidence That It Has a Sufficient Interest in the Pipeline Was 
Undisputed, and at the Very Least Creates a Question of Fact Sufficient 
to Preclude Summary Judgment 
Newfield's response brief focuses on a single material fact. Newfield asserts 
that it is undisputed that Bonanza never transferred title to the pipeline to Mr. 
Gilmore because Weststar failed to produce a copy of an unrecorded assignment by 
4 
which this transfer took place. (Resp. Br. at 17.) Specifically, Newfield argues that 
"the record stands uncontradicted that Bonanza Gas owns the pipeline/' (id. at 11), 
even though Bonanza, which no longer exits, has stated through Mr. Gilmore, its 
former sole partner, that Bonanza does not own the pipeline. (R. 371, 479.) 
Ironically, insofar as there is an undisputed fact it is undisputed that Bonanza did 
transfer title of the pipeline to Mr. Gilmore, as Mr. Gilmore's affidavit testimony to 
that effect stands undisputed. Regardless, all Weststar must demonstrate on appeal 
is that the district court erred in concluding that it is undisputed Bonanza did not 
transfer ownership Mr. Gilmore. This burden is easily satisfied. 
A. The Evidence Presented by Weststar Establishes Its Ownership 
Interest 
As outlined in the opening brief, Mr. Gilmore testified in his affidavit that he 
"received title to the Pipeline from Bonanza Gas Company . . . by unrecorded 
assignment." (R. 371.) Mr. Gilmore than explained that "Bonanza was an entity 
which I formedf, and] I was the officer and sole partner of Bonanza at the time 
Bonanza assigned the Pipeline to me." (Id.) Mr. Gilmore's testimony is based upon 
his personal knowledge and therefore is sufficient to create a disputed issue of fact 
concerning the transfer. Weststar satisfied its burden in opposing summary 
judgment by setting forth "facts that would be admissible in evidence and show[ing] 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Walker v. 
Rocky Mountain Recreation Crop., 508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1973). This alone is a 
sufficient ground for this Court to reverse. 
5 
Even ignoring Mr. Gilmore's affidavit, however, there is ample evidence of 
the assignment from Bonanza to Mr. Gilmore. First, the written assignment of title 
from Mr. Gilmore to Weststar is evidence that Mr. Gilmore had title to transfer, title 
he could have obtained only from Bonanza. (R. 371-72, 362-65.) Since Bonanza 
does not dispute the transfer, it is unclear on what basis Newfield does so. This 
additional evidence was before the court when it decided the motion for summary 
judgment. (Id.) 
Second, the 2004 participation agreement between Weststar and Houston 
Exploration provided Houston Exploration a 50% interest in the use of the pipeline 
and named Weststar as operator of the pipeline. (R. 721-804.) Mr. Gilmore's 
deposition testimony also confirms Houston Exploration's interest in the pipeline, as 
does the 2004 assignment of the interest from Weststar to Houston Exploration. (R. 
332-33, 335, 822.) In fact, Newfield set forth in its own summary judgment papers 
as an undisputed fact that Houston Exploration currently has this 50% interest. (R. 
2
 In a footnote, Newfield cites Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, 979 P.2d 338, for the 
proposition that a conveyance to a nonexistent entity is a nullity and therefore the 
transfer to Weststar was a nullity because Weststar was formally created a few 
months after Mr. Gilmore transferred title to it. (Resp. Br. at 13 n.6.) Young, 
however, concerned a trust that never existed. In contrast, Weststar does exist, and 
like any corporation Weststar was capable of being bound by Mr. Gilmore's acts 
prior to its incorporation. Tanner v. Sinaloa Land & Fruit Co., 134 P. 586, 589 
(Utah 1913) (while "parties who undertake to organize a corporation cannot bind the 
corporation by their contracts and agreements made before the company is 
incorporated[, t]he authorities . . . practically all agree that a corporation may by 
corporate action adopt the contracts of its promoters"). In any event, such questions 
surrounding Weststar's ownership demonstrate, at most, an issue of fact that cannot 
be resolved as a matter of law. 
6 
338.) Weststar could only have transferred this interest to Houston Exploration if 
Mr. Gilmore had previously transferred his interest to Weststar; again, something 
Mr. Gilmore could have done only if the transfer between Bonanza and Mr. Gilmore 
occurred. Contrary to Newfield's suggestion, this additional evidence was before 
the district court when it entered summary judgment. (R. 332-33, 335, 721-804, 
819-22,901:53,56.) 
Third, Mr. Gilmore testified in his deposition that he was the sole owner of 
Bonanza and that Bonanza transferred its interest in the pipeline to Mr. Gilmore. 
(R. 479.) And contrary to Bonanza's suggestion in a footnote, (Resp. Br. at 10-11 
n.4), the relevant portions of Mr. Gilmore's deposition testimony were presented to 
the district court with Newfield's summary judgment papers. (R. 332-33, 479.) 
Fourth, the BLM currently recognizes that Weststar owns the pipeline, 
something that could be true only if Bonanza transferred title to Mr. Gilmore before 
Mr. Gilmore transferred title to Weststar. (R. 579, 628.) Newfield is correct that 
this evidence was only before the district court when it decided Weststar's motion to 
reconsider and therefore the Court need not consider it. However, it is noteworthy 
that the very evidence Newfield asserts, and the district court concluded, provides 
no basis to conclude Weststar owns the pipeline was sufficient for the BLM to 
conclude just the opposite, a fact of which the Court may take judicial notice.3 
3
 Arkla Exploration Co. v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 734 F.2d 347, 361 n.22 (8th Cir. 
1984) ("Even though IM 84-35 is not part of the record on appeal, the Court is fully 
empowered to take judicial notice of it as it is an order or rule issued by BLM 
pursuant to its delegated authority."); see also New York Indians v. United States, 
7 
Regardless, for all the reasons set forth above, the Court need not consider the BLM 
evidence to reverse the district court's order. There is ample evidence of Weststar's 
ownership interest to create an issue of fact sufficient to overcome summary 
judgment. 
B. Neither Rule 1002 Nor the Statute of Frauds Precludes Mr. 
Gilmore's Affidavit Testimony From Creating a Question of Fact 
Concerning Weststar's Ownership Interest in the Pipeline 
Newfield's response to the overwhelming evidence that Bonanza transferred 
title to the pipeline to Mr. Gilmore is twofold. First, Newfield misconstrues 
Weststar's alternative arguments—e.g., that the transfer of ownership from Bonanza 
to Mr. Gilmore would have taken place by operation of Texas law even if there had 
been no formal transfer4—as Weststar's only arguments, and repeatedly asserts that 
Weststar has abandoned its claim that Weststar owns the pipeline. (Resp. Br. at 5, 
as these documents are not referred to in the findings of fact by the court below, this 
court cannot consider them; but as they are documents of which we may take 
judicial notice, we think the fact that they are not incorporated in the findings of the 
court will not preclude us from examining them, with a view of inquiring whether 
they have the bearing claimed. While it is ordinarily true that this court takes notice 
of only such facts as are found by the court below, it may take notice of matters of 
common observation, of statutes, records or public documents, which were not 
called to its attention, or other similar matters of judicial cognizance."). 
4
 Specifically, Weststar identified an alternative method whereby, even if Bonanza 
had not formally transferred the pipeline to Mr. Gilmore, the same transfer would 
have occurred by operation of Texas law when Bonanza dissolved. Courseview, 
Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.. 312 S.W.2d 197, 203 (Tex. 1957); (R. 371, 479, 581-
84.) In response, Newfield argues that title would not have automatically 
transferred if Bonanza had creditors and taxes due when it dissolved. (Resp. Br. at 
20.) In the end, Newfield's argument highlights, at best, that disputed issues of fact 
remain to be resolved, and therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate. 
8 
10, 11, 17, 20.) Second, Newfield argues that Mr, Gilmore's affidavit is 
inadmissible and that Weststar was somehow required to produce a copy of the 
written assignment between Bonanza and Mr. Gilmore to create an issue of fact 
concerning Weststar's present ownership. (Resp. Br. at 17-18.) Weststar will 
address each argument in turn. 
Newfield's first argument that Weststar has abandoned its claim that 
Weststar owns the pipeline is puzzling. Two-thirds of the argument section in 
Weststar's opening brief is dedicated to this claim. (Opening Br. at 10-14.) 
Weststar made the same arguments it reiterates here: (i) Mr. Gilmore's affidavit is 
based upon his personal knowledge and is evidence that Bonanza transferred title to 
Mr. Gilmore; (ii) the assignment from Mr. Gilmore to Weststar is further evidence 
not only of the transfer of title from Bonanza to Mr. Gilmore but also that Weststar 
now owns the pipeline; and (iii) because Houston Exploration now has an interest in 
the pipeline, Weststar must have had some interest in the pipeline when it entered 
into the agreement with Houston Exploration in 2004. (Opening Br. at 10-11.) 
Newfield ignores this evidence and simply asserts that "the record stands 
uncontradicted that Bonanza Gas owns the pipeline," even though Bonanza no 
longer exists and its sole partner when it did exist—Mr. Gilmore—has testified that 
Bonanza transferred title to the pipeline. (Resp. Br. at 11.) No entity has ever 
challenged Weststar's ownership of the pipeline, ownership now confirmed by the 
BLM. Weststar not only did not abandon the argument that it owns the pipeline, but 
9 
demonstrated in its opening brief that Newfield provided no evidence to suggest 
otherwise. 
Newfield's second argument is that Mr. Gilmore's affidavit is inadmissible 
and that to preclude summary judgment Weststar was required to produce a written 
copy of the assignment from Bonanza. (Resp. Br. at 17-18.) This argument also 
fails. Newfield asserts, without any explanation, that Mr. Gilmore's affidavit 
violates Rule 1002 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which requires an original 
writing to prove its content. (Resp. Br. at 17.) Not only was this argument not 
raised in the district court and not adequately briefed in the response brief,5 it has no 
application here. In this case, it is not the precise language of the assignment that is 
crucial but the fact that the assignment occurred. As this Court has explained, 
where the existence of a document, such as a license, instead of its content is at 
issue, the "best evidence rule, by its terms, has no applicability." Billings v. 
Nielson, 738 P.2d 1047, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("Rule 1002 exists because 
presenting to the court the exact words of some writings is of more than average 
importance, particularly in dispositive or operative documents. A slight difference 
in words may result in a great difference in rights.") (citing Kennedy v. Lynch, 513 
P.2d 1261 (N.M. 1973)). Here, Mr. Gilmore's testimony is that the assignment took 
place. The fact that the written document cannot be located is beside the point. 
5
 W. Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, f29, 135 P.3d 874 (appellate courts are 
"not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument 
and research"); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998) (appellate courts 
"will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed"). 
10 
The position Newfield advances cannot be correct. It would leave a 
homeowner without standing to bring a trespass action if he could not produce the 
original document by which every prior homeowner took title of the property. In 
other words, if a document in a chain of title is lost, a homeowner would have no 
standing even when (i) the two entities involved in the now-undocumented 
transaction testify that the transaction occurred, (ii) nobody else claims to own the 
property, (iii) the homeowner provides the written documents by which he took title, 
and (iv) the alleged trespasser does not deny he was on the property without 
authorization or that the homeowner was thereby damaged. Newfield has provided 
no support for such an extraordinary rule, and Rule 1002 does not supply it. 
Newfield next asserts that Mr. Gilmore's affidavit is insufficient because the 
statute of frauds requires Weststar to produce the written assignment from Bonanza 
to Mr. Gilmore. (Resp. Br. at 17.) The statute of frauds does not hold that a 
transaction never occurred if the written document by which it occurred cannot later 
be located. Mr. Gilmore testified that the assignment occurred via an unrecorded 
written assignment. (R. 371.) This satisfies the statute of frauds. Mr. Gilmore does 
not purport to transfer title by his testimony, but only to testify about the transfer. 
The fact that the document cannot be located does not demonstrate that the writing 
never existed, especially where, as here, the parties to the transaction confirm that 
the transaction did take place via written instrument. 
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In the end, Weststar's evidence that it owns the pipeline is both admissible 
and unopposed. Newfield's position—that it is undisputed that Bonanza owns the 
pipeline—has no evidence to support it and is refuted by the testimony of Bonanza's 
former sole partner, Mr. Gilmore. While Newfield may question Mr. Gilmore's 
credibility, such questions become relevant only at trial, not when ruling on motions 
for summary judgment. Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). At the 
very least, there is a disputed issue of fact concerning whether Weststar owns the 
pipeline, a dispute that precludes summary judgment. The Court should reverse the 
district court's order granting summary judgment. Newfield should not be permitted 
to escape all liability for its years of unauthorized use of the pipeline.6 
II. A Possessory Interest Is All that Is Required to Maintain an Action for 
Trespass or Unjust Enrichment. Weststar Has Presented Ample 
Evidence of Its Possessory Interest in the Pipeline to Create an Issue of 
Material Fact, Making Summary Judgment Inappropriate 
Wholly apart from Weststar's ownership interest in the pipeline, summary 
judgment was inappropriate because Weststar provided evidence of its possessory 
interest in the pipeline, which is sufficient to confer Weststar standing to advance its 
trespass and unjust enrichment claims. Contrary to established Utah law, the trial 
court required Weststar to prove an "ownership interest" in the pipeline to survive 
6
 Newfield suggests in its fact section, but does not argue, that one Appellee, 
Cochrane Resources, Inc. could not have trespassed or been unjustly enriched 
because for a time it operated the pipeline under court order. (Resp. Br. at 4-5.) 
While Weststar does not dispute that Cochrane could act as authorized by court 
order, (R. 457), there is no indication that a court order authorized Cochrane to use 
the pipeline to benefit its own wells without charge, (R. 461), or to reconstruct the 
pipeline such that Weststar could not use the pipeline for its own wells. (R. 417.) 
12 
summary judgment. (R. 539.5.) Similarly, Newfield insists that an ownership 
interest is a prerequisite to Weststar5s claims.7 
While trespass and unjust enrichment claims are often filed by owners of 
property, proof of an ownership interest is not required. A possessory interest is 
adequate. John Price Assoc, Inc. v. Utah State Conf, Bricklayers Locals Nos. 1, 2, 
&_6, 615 P.2d 1210, 1214 (Utah 1980) ("Trespass is a possessory action. The gist 
of an action for trespass is infringement on the right of possession."); Desert Miriah, 
Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ^ 13, 12 P.3d 580 (outlining the elements of an 
unjust enrichment claim). The 2004 participation agreement with Houston 
Exploration designating Weststar as the operator demonstrates that Weststar had a 
possessory interest in the pipeline during the last year of Newfield's unauthorized 
use. New American Oil & Mining Co. v. Trover, 76 N.E. 253, 254 (Ind. 1905) (R. 
332-33; 901: 16, 53, 56; 782, 785, 804.) Prior to 2004, Weststar had the possessory 
interests that both Houston Exploration and Weststar currently hold pursuant to the 
participation agreement. Throughout the six years of Newfleld's unauthorized use, 
this possessory interest alone is sufficient to preclude summary judgment. 
n 
Newfield also argues that Weststar has raised a new argument. (Response Br. at 
12.) However, Weststar raised this argument during oral argument on the motion 
for summary judgment. (R. 901:34-35.) In addition, Newfield in its summary 
judgment papers argued that the proper standard is possession, not ownership. (R. 
268.) 
13 
III. Because Weststar is the Operator of the Pipeline and Its Relationship 
with Collins, Ware and Houston Exploration Is Governed by 
Contractual Agreements That Allow Weststar to Bring this Lawsuit, No 
Other Parties Need to Be Joined 
As an alternative ground to affirm, Newfield raises the argument that 
Weststar has failed to join indispensable parties who also have interests in the 
pipeline. (Resp. Br. at 23-25.) This argument fails not only because the parties with 
interests—Houston Exploration, Mr. Ware, and Mr. Collins—are not indispensable 
under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but also because even if they 
were indispensable, only dismissal without prejudice would be appropriate. 
Therefore, Newfield5s argument does not supply an alternative ground to affirm the 
district court's order dismissing Weststar's claims on the merits. 
Rule 19 requires the joinder of necessary parties in order to "protect the 
interest of absent persons as well as those already before the court from multiple 
litigation or inconsistent judicial determinations." Grand Cty. v. Rogers, 2002 UT 
25, f28, 44 P.3d 734. Under Rule 19, a court must "first determine whether a party 
is necessary" and then, if the party is necessary, the court must "consider whether 
joinder of the necessary party is feasible." Id. at [^29. Only if the party is necessary 
and joinder is feasible must the party be joined. Id. Then, only after the court 
concludes that joinder is not feasible, does the court "address the indispensability of 
the party [under Rule 19(b)] . . . and decide whether the action should proceed or be 
dismissed." Id; see also Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 
1990) ("Only if a party is found necessary under the rule 19(a) analysis and the party 
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cannot feasibly be joined does a court need to analyze indispensability under rule 
19(b)."). 
Mr. Collins, Mr. Ware, and Houston Exploration are not necessary parties 
under Rule 19(a). The two agreements that provide these entities interests in the 
pipeline also authorize Weststar to bring a lawsuit on their behalf. First, under the 
1988 operating agreement by which Mr. Collins and Mr. Ware obtained an interest 
in the pipeline, Weststar, as the operator, is obligated to engage in litigation on 
behalf of the non-operators to "protect or recover" their joint interests. (R. 427, 
547.) Second, the participation agreement between Weststar and Houston 
Exploration allows Weststar, as the operator, to sue on behalf of itself and Houston 
Exploration. (R. 772.) 
The 1988 operating agreement authorizes Weststar to bring a lawsuit such as 
this to recover for damages to the lease property. For example, the Accounting 
Procedure Joint Operations ("APJO") attached to the 1988 operating agreement 
recognizes the operator's capability to bring such a lawsuit on behalf of the non-
operating interest holders. (R. 427, 429.) The operator is charged with conducting 
"Joint Operations" which includes "all operations necessary or proper for the 
development, operation, protection and maintenance of the Joint Property." (R. 
429.) This includes bringing this lawsuit, as recognized in the APJO's provision for 
"Direct Charges," under which the operator may charge the Joint Account with the 
"[e]xpense of handling, investigating and settling litigation or claims, discharging of 
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liens, payment of judgments and amounts paid for settlement of claims incurred in 
or resulting from operations under the agreement or necessary to protect or recover 
the Joint Property." (R. 427 (emphasis added).) This lawsuit is necessary to protect 
or recover the pipeline from the physical reconstruction and unauthorized and 
unremunerated use. Thus, Mr. Collins and Mr. Ware are not indispensable parties 
under Rule 19. 
Further, Newfield states that the trespass and damage done to the pipeline 
was prior to Houston Exploration's ownership interest was acquired. (Resp. Br. at 
23.) Thus, under Newfield's own logic, Houston Exploration is not an 
indispensable party to this litigation. The trespass to the pipeline began in 1999, and 
most of the damage occurred prior to March 1, 2004, when Houston Exploration 
acquired its interest in the pipeline. (R. 804, 822, 369-71.) However, even if some 
of the claims did arise after Houston Exploration acquired its interest (the 
unauthorized use and damage to the pipeline was not discovered until August 2004 
and continued until June 2005), Houston Exploration is not an indispensable party. 
(R. 369-71; 335.) Like the 1988 operating agreement, the agreement entered into 
between Weststar and Houston Exploration allows Weststar, as the operator, to sue 
on behalf of itself and the non-operator. (R. 772.) 
Newfield states that the participation agreement allows the operator to "settle 
any single uninsured third party claim or suit arising from operations hereunder if 
the expenditure does not exceed $10,000." (Resp. Br. at 23; R. 901: 54; 772.) 
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Newfield's argument fails for two reasons. First, this provision uses the 
word "expenditure," not "recovery," and therefore Weststar's prior counsel's 
statement at oral argument that Weststar may seek millions in damages is 
irrelevant. Second, because only a limited amount of the damage occurred once 
Houston Exploration acquired its interest in the pipeline in 2004, the damages 
during this time period may be minimal, and if so, then Weststar can maintain this 
lawsuit under the agreement. 
Because Weststar, in its relationship with Mr. Collins, Mr. Ware, and 
Houston Exploration, is charged as the operator to protect and maintain the 
property, which includes the pipeline, it may bring this lawsuit on behalf of the non-
operating interest holders. Their interests in the pipeline are represented through 
Weststar, and Weststar may be obligated as the operator to disperse funds awarded 
in the lawsuit among the non-operating interest holders. 
Mr. Collins, Mr. Ware, and Houston Exploration therefore are not necessary 
parties. Under Rule 19(a), "a party is necessary if 'in his absence complete relief 
cannot be accorded among those already parties.'" Landes, 795 P.2d at 1130 
(quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)). Also, a party is necessary "if he claims an 
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of 
the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to 
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a 
8
 Additionally, the operating agreement itself allows for authority to be delegated to 
the operator if expenditures exceed the $10,000 amount. (R. 772.) 
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substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations 
by reason of his claimed interest." Id. (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)). In Landes, 
the named party was authorized to sue on behalf of the party that was alleged to be a 
necessary party. Id. at 1131. 
Landes is similar to this case, in which Weststar is authorized by virtue of its 
role as operator to bring this suit in maintenance and protection of the subject 
property. The Landes court held that the party was not necessary under these 
circumstances, even stating that joining the party would be "redundant," because 
complete relief for all entities with an interest could be obtained by the party to the 
lawsuit. Id. The same holds true here—adding the allegedly necessary parties 
would be redundant. 
Moreover, "[jjoinder is not mandated under Rule 19(a)(1) where, even 
though certain types of relief are unavailable due to a party's absence, other 
meaningful relief can be provided." Wood & Locker, Inc. v. Doran & Associates, 
708 F. Supp. 684, 689-690 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that allegedly necessary parties 
to an operating agreement were not necessary parties in an action to rescind the 
agreement).9 
Here, meaningful relief is available to all non-operating interest holders 
under the operating and participation agreements. As operator, Weststar must 
9
 "Rule 19 of the Utah rules is essentially similar to rule 19 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Therefore, in addition to applicable Utah cases, we look to the 
abundant federal experience in the area for guidance." Landes, 795 P.2d at 1130. 
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disperse funds proportionally due those parties in accordance with the agreements. 
They are therefore not necessary parties to this case and this Court should not 
uphold the district court's dismissal on this basis. Mr. Collins, Mr. Ware, and 
Houston Exploration have a means to obtain relief under these agreements should 
Weststar not disperse an award according to its obligations; such an action would in 
no way be barred by res judicata from this lawsuit. Accordingly, Rule 19(a)(2) also 
does not render these parties "necessary" for this case. Because these parties are not 
necessary as a matter of law, indispensability need not be considered. Landes, 795 
P.2d at 1130 (holding that "the court of appeals improperly considered 
indispensability without first deciding the necessary party question"). The other 
parties holding ownership interests in the pipeline have complete and meaningful 
relief as non-operating interest holders under the agreements. Thus, the alternative 
ground for dismissal cited by Newfield fails. 
Even if the Court performs the Rule 19 factual analysis itself and concludes 
that there are necessary parties that could not be feasibly joined,10 the Court should 
nonetheless reverse the district court's order insofar as the dismissal was with 
prejudice. Bonneville Tower Condominium Mgt. Comm. v. Thompson Michie 
Assocs., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986) (holding that dismissal with prejudice for 
failure to join an indispensable party would be an abuse of discretion); see also 
10
 Newfield states that Houston Exploration was not damaged by the trespass. 
(Resp. Br. at 23.) Therefore, Newfield is asking only that Mr. Collins and Mr. Ware 
be added. 
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Kemp v, Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 761 n.3 (Utah 1984), (dismissal under Rule 19 
"does not preclude a plaintiff from renewing his claim in a complaint naming the 
indispensable party or the real party in interest."). Regardless of the merits of 
Newfield's Rule 19 argument, the Court should reverse the district court's order and 
remand the case so Weststar's claims can be resolved on the merits. 
Conclusion 
The Court should reverse the district court's order granting sumipary 
judgment because Weststar presented evidence to create a disputed issue of fact 
concerning whether Weststar owned the pipeline between 1999 and 2005, the time 
period of Newfield's unauthorized use. Weststar's trespass and unjust enrichment 
claims should be adjudicated on the merits. 
In addition, Weststar presented evidence of its possessory interest in the 
pipeline during this same time period, which is also a sufficient ground for reversal. 
Finally, no other parties need to be joined to this action. However, insofar as the 
Court concludes that indispensable parties must be joined, the Court must reverse 
that portion of the district court's order that dismissed Weststar's claims with 
prejudice. Regardless, the Court should reverse and remand. 
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